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[1] Negligence--Care Toward Invitees-Knowledge of Danger.-
mere fnc:t that business visitor has some time been 
his vehicle on property owned by defendant does 
not constitute sub:,tantial evidence in and of itself to put 
defendant-owner on notice that other business visitors are 
thereby threatened with is not 
sutllcient to owner \vhere an 
arises out of a isolated, act by the 
ness visitor vehicle. 
[2] !d.-Care by Occupant of Real Property.-A of land 
who holds it out to the public for entry for business pur-
poses is subject to liability to members of the public while 
are on the land for such for bodily harm 
caused to them by the or intentionally 
harmful acts of third persons or animals if the possessor by 
the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered that 
such nets were being done or were about to be done and pro-
tected the members of the public by controlling the conduct 
of third persons or a warning adequate to enable them 
to avoid harm without relinquishing any of the services they 
are !'ntitled to receive from him. 
[3] !d.-Anticipating Negligence.-In the absence of conduct to 
put person on notice to the he is entitled to as-
sume that others Viill not act or unlawfully. 
[ 4] Id.-Evidence.--ln an action for injuries sustained an in-
vitee at defendant's self-service station when another invitee 
an air hose to blow out the pipeline on his 
a stream of gasoline to strike the first 
in her burning her and materially impairing her 
defendant was not liable where there was no evidence 
truck owner hnd been acting negligently or any evi-
dence that could possibly put defendant on notice that he 





McK. Dig. References: [l] 
§57;[3] §27;[4] 
§ 113; Am.Jur., Negligence,§ 97. 
§ 95; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 92 
§ 43; Am.Jur., 
Neg ligenee, § 7 4; 
§ 141. 
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APPEAI, from a judgment of thr Court of the 
and of San Franeis(·o. A. K. Wyl 
Hrwrse(l. 
A~tion against operator of gasoline servi~e station for in-
juries to an invitee eaused by the negligent aet of another 
invitee. Judgment for plaintiff reversed. 
Bledsor, Smith, Catlwart, Johnson & Phelps, R S. Cath-
eart and Wilbur ,J. Huss for Appellant. 
I_jeon A. Blum and Harold h Levin for Hesponc.1ent. 
McCOMB, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment in favor 
of plaintiff after trial before a jury in an aetion to reeover 
damages for personal injuries received while plaintiff was a 
business visitor on defendant's property. 
Facts: Defrnclant owned a self-servire gasoline station in 
San Prancisco, on a lot approximately 100 feet square. Gaso-
line was di:,;pensed from pumps located in the center of the lot. 
Air and water facilities were located along a side of the lot for 
use by customers desiring to service their own vehieles. On 
the same edge of the lot and near the air and water outlets, 
a large blackboard was maintained by defendant for posting 
·winning numbers in drawings of tickets previously given 
purchasers of defendant's gasoline. 
On July 7, 1D53, Mr. Paris, a customer, bought some gasoline 
for his pick-up truck. Being unable to start the motor, he 
pushed his truek over to the area where the air and water fix-
tures were situated. He worked on the battery and motor for 
six or seven hours. 
The station attendant paid no attention to lVIr. Paris' activi-
ties, and did not offer to assist him or render any aid. Mr. 
Paris finally decided that the pipeline leading to the gasoline 
tank on his truek might be plugged. He then procee<1ed to 
blow it out with the air hose provided to inflate tires. Instead 
of the usual metal eap on the intake hole of thr gasoline tank, 
there was simply a rag stuffed into the vent. lVIr. Paris did 
not remove this rag, bnt diseonneeted the main gasoline line 
from underneath the car and attached the air hose to it to 
blow out the line. 
In the nwantime, plaintiff and her husband drove into 
the station. "While her husband was purchasing gasoline, 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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plaintiff got out of the car and went to the blackboard to see 
whether she held any winning tickets in the drawing. She 
was standing immediately at the rear of Mr. Paris' truck 
when suddenly a stream of gasoline from the truck's tank 
hit her in the face, causing serious burns on her face, chest, 
arms and neck. Her eyesight was materially impaired. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum 
of $5,000. 
[1] 'l'his is the sole question necessary for us to determine: 
Does the mere fact that a business visitor has for some i'ime 
been working on his vehicle on property owned by defendant 
constittde substantial evidence in and of itself to put the 
defendant-owner on notice that other bttsiness visitors are 
thereby threatened with danger, amd is such "possibility" 
sttfficient to impose liability on the owner where an injury 
arises out of a rnornentary, isolated, negligent act by the busi-
ness visitor wm·king on his vehicle? 
No. [2] The rule is correctly stated thus in Restatement, 
Torts, section 348 : 
''A . . . possessor of land who holds it out to the public 
for entry for his business purposes, is subject to liability to 
members of the public while upon the land for such purpose 
for bodily harm caused to them by the accidental, negligent 
or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals if 
the poNsessor by the exercise of reasonable care could have 
(a) discovered that such acts were being done or were 
about to be done, and 
(b) protected the members of the public by 
(i) controlling the conduct of the third persons, or 
(ii) giving a warning adequate to enable them to avoid 
the harm without relinquishing any of the services which 
they are entitled to receive from [him]." 
This rule presupposes that the owner of the land by reason-
able care could have discovered that the act which caused the 
harm was being done or was about to be done. 
[3] In Porter v. Cal'ifornia Jockey Club, Inc., 134 Cal. 
App.2d 158, lGO I2J [28:) P.2d GO], the rule is stated thus: 
"It is axiomatic that in the absence o£ eonduct to put him on 
notice to the eontrary a person is enti tied to assume that 
others will not aet negligently or unlawfully. (Citation.) '' 
(See also lllawhiney v. Signal Tmcking Co., 1:32 Cal.App.2d 
809, 81:{ [8] !283 P.2d 27] .) 
[4] Applying the foregoing rnle to the facts of the present 
case, there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Paris had 
there was an 
J., and 
invitee of the operator 
Plaintiff left her automobile 
maintained by defendant to notify 
of tiekets previously dis-
near the air 
hy a stream 
aets of an-
def'endant and had been 
He' was defendant 









that Paris was 
duty to 
such facilities were uot so 
the injury had resulted 
negligent usc of defcndn11t 's 
would be as snch condud ~wou1d be 
control oE defendant. Here defendant 
knowingly Paris 
facilities and thus cause 
marized 
opinion when this ease 
peal, which affirmed the 
pellant furnished a 
\\'ithin 
on their cars. Appellant or should have that 
persons using the facilities furnished by it might include 
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amateurs, and other 
reasonable possibility that such persons working on 
an instrumentality such as an automobile might create a dan-
gerous situation. Yet appellant made no ef'Eort at all to 
discover what Paris was doing or how he might be doing it. 
He invited other customers to come to the area by maintaining 
the blackboard in the immediate vicinity of the area where 
Paris was working. No warning signs were posted to warn 
invitees of the possible danger. Appellant knew, or should 
have known, that Paris was working on his car for many 
hours. Appellant knew that the trouble was not battery trou-
ble because appellant's employee had sold Paris a new battery 
and the employee knew that this did not start Paris' car. 
Certainly the attendant knew, or should have known, that 
Paris might be engaged in any one of several activities that 
could create a danger to those nearby. He knew, or should 
have known, that among these possibilities was that if the 
person working on his car believed the gasoline line was 
stopped up lJC might use the air pressure to blow it out. He 
knew, or should have known, that the gasoline tank was 
capped with a rag stuffed in the vent. Paris was working on 
his car w·here the air hose was located. The possibility that 
the air hose might be used for this purpose was not so un-
likely that it was unforeseeable as a matter of law.'' ( Httnter 
v. Mohawk Petroleum Corp. (CaLApp.), 332 P.2d 551.) 
Prom this evidence the District Court of Appeal concluded 
that the jury could infer that defendant had notice of the 
possible danger to customers in the area of the blackboard. 
I wholeheartedly agree with this conclusion and can see no 
escape from the fact that the inferences to be drawn from this 
evidenee ·were within the provinee of the jury. Therefore, the 
jury verdict cannot be disturbed by this court unless it again 
usurps the function of the jury and takes another excursion 
into the fact finding field. 
:F'or the foregoing reasons I would affirm the judgment. 
